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THE SINKING OF THE ELEFTHERJA
ERIN

M. O'TooLEt

ABSTRACT

This note details recent common law and statutory developments in
Canadian law relating to the use of choice offorum clauses in bills of
lading and other contracts for carriage used in international trade. This
includes a focus on the new approach for the exercise of judicial
discretion advanced by the Federal Court ofAppeal in Ecu-Line NV. v.
Z.J. Pompey lndustrie, which is currently under review by the Supreme
Court of Canada. To provide a contextual framework for these developments, an overview of the historical development of private international law relating to choice ofjurisdiction is included. This framework
involves an examination of the House of Lords decision in The
Elefiheria, which served as the international benchmark for choice of
forum and was the foundation for both American and Canadian precedent in the area.

I.

INTRODUCTION

The learned justices of the Supreme Court of Canada are at this moment
1
pondering the fate of the good ship
The sturdy vessel
recently ran aground in the Federal Court of Appeal after competently
traversing the oceans of Canadian jurisprudence for decades. On appeal
of Z.I. Pompey lndustrie v. Ecu-Line NV. 2 the Supreme Court of Canada
t

Erin Michael O'Toole is a third year student at Dalhousie Law School, where he won the
CCH Canada Ltd. Prize in Legal Research and Writing. He has a B.A. (Hons.) from the Royal
Military College of Canada and served as an officer in the Canadian Air Force for five years
before law school. He will be articling with Stikeman Elliott in Toronto.
'The ship involved in The "Eleftheria" (1969] I Lloyd's Rep. 237. [Eleftheria]
2
(1999] F.C.J. No. 1584 [Z.l. Pompey]. Only the case name will be referenced, as the levels of
court are separated in this paper. If a quotation is taken from a different level of court, it will be
specified in the note.
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has reserved its decision, so they stand poised to either salvage the
injured vessel, or let it sink into the murky abyss of rejected stare
decisis.
The lower courts and the Federal Court of Appeal made radical
departures from the established course set by the Eleftheria regarding
interpretation and application of bills of lading and other standard
documents used in the international trade and carriage of goods. This
departure from precedent not only jeopardizes the freedom for parties to
contract according to their preferences regarding the resolution of disputes arising from the agreement, but the decision also creates uncertainty in this area of the law and requires remedy by the Supreme Court
of Canada. Statutory developments have also muddied the waters regarding the traditional discretion of courts in their consideration of stay
proceedings related to jurisdiction clauses in bills of lading. The Z.J.
Pompey3 decision of the Supreme Court of Canada should incorporate
both statutory and jurisprudential changes in Canada, but measure them
against the established international precedent rooted in Elefiheria. The
outcome of this decision could have substantial ramifications on the
international carriage of goods in and out of Canada.

1. Development of Choice of Forum

The bill of lading promotes the efficient and effective delivery and
transfer of goods from buyer to seller and remains the linchpin of global
commerce. It not only functions as a receipt for the goods throughout the
shipment process, but the bill itself also becomes a document of title and
provides evidence of the contractual arrangement between shipper and
carrier. 4 The bill contains terms and conditions dealing with the rights
and obligations of each party, as well as their consensus ad idem
regarding the forum for adjudication of disputes and the choice of law
that is to be applied to these disputes.

3

Ibid.
Taken from, J.G. Castel, ed., The Canadian Law and Practice of International Trade,
(Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications Limited, 1997) at 253. For a full description of
the legal characteristics of Bills of Lading and their evolution see P. Todd, Bills of Lading and
Bankers' Documentary Credits, (London: LLP Reference Publishing, 1998).

4
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Choice of forum clauses developed with two distinct principles. The
concept of prorogation developed in the common law, and allowed for a
contractually specified court to have "jurisdiction by submission". 5
Essentially this meant that the defendant in a dispute submitted to the
jurisdiction of their agreement, even though this forum may not have
had any connection with either party or any other element of the transaction. By submitting to this jurisdiction the party responding to the claim
forgoes their natural forum, whether that would be their domestic court
or another jurisdiction connected with the dispute.
The second principle of choice of forum is derogation. 6 This appears
to be the obvious result of prorogation, but derogation actually has
greater ramifications. With the parties "opting in" to a specific forum in
their agreement, this has the effect of"opting out" of the jurisdiction that
would have been nonnally associated with the dispute. The effect of
derogation was to exclude a specific jurisdiction, either by express
reference or implied derogation. This would oust the forum that would
most naturally flow from the dispute at issue, were it not for the
agreement evidenced by the bill of lading.
The freedom for parties to contract into a jurisdiction or choice of
forum clause began to achieve acceptance by English courts in the midnineteenth century, and the principle was recognized by statute in 1854.
The Common Law Procedure Act 18547 gave courts discretion over the
granting of a stay, where the contract provided for arbitration of disputes.

2. The Eleftheria
By the late nineteenth century, the common law recognized the freedom
for parties to contract into an express choice of forum in their agreements. If a matter was raised with a court, it was to give effect to the
choice of forum clause and stay the proceedings, unless the court had
statutory discretion to refuse the stay. Eventually, the common law
developed to allow courts to retain inherent discretion in the interests of
5
6
7

P. Nygh, Autonomy in Intemational Contracts, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999) at 15.
Ibid. at 19.
Ibid.
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fairness or justice apmi from express statutory authority. 8 This enhancement of judicial discretion was fully elaborated upon by the English
Admiralty court in the seminal case of Eleftheria. 9
In this case, the comi was faced with a dispute arising out of a bill of
lading, which involved the carriage of a cargo of beech plywood from
Romania to the United Kingdom. The bill oflading contained an express
jurisdiction or choice of forum clause. Clause 3 of the bill provided that
disputes would be "decided in the country where the Carrier has his
principal place ofbusiness", 10 which was a relatively common choice of
forum concept in international trade.
The motor vessel "Eleftheria" was owned by a Greek shipping
company. Being based out of Athens, this served as its "principal place
of business". The vessel had discharged its plywood cargo at Rotterdam
instead of the specified U.K. ports due to labour disruptions at those
ports. Another clause in the bill of lading seemed to allow for this
alteration in the port of discharge. This change in the port of delivery
and the application of this alteration provision in the bill of lading were
at the heart of the dispute. The Greek ship-owners applied to the British
court to stay the action brought against them by the cargo-owners. They
claimed that the bill of lading, as contract for carriage of the goods,
expressly provided for all disputes to be deferred to the courts of Greece.
After a careful consideration of the evidence provided by both sides
in the stay application, Justice Brandon stated the law as it applies to the
application of a choice of forum clause expressly derogating the jurisdiction at hand. He established an approach that would have comis give
deference to the agreement of the parties and "not just pay lip service" 11
to contractual freedom. The court was to prima .facie grant the stay
unless the other party could "show good cause" 12 to deny the stay. The
grounds to be considered by the court in the exercise of their discretion
in denying the stay were articulated by Justice Brandon in his oft-quoted
passage at page 242:
Ibid. at 20.
Eleftheria, supra note 1.
10
E!eftheria, supra note 1 at 238.
11
E!eftheria, supra note 1 at 245.
12
Eleftheria, supra note 1 at 242. Justice Brandon again used this term "good cause" in the
concluding paragraph of his judgment at page 246. Subsequent courts used the "good cause"
examination outlined by Brandon J. to create what has become a "strong reasons" burden on
the party opposing the stay. See The Sea Pearl, infra note 17 at 681.
8

9
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The principles established by the authorities can, I think, be summarized as follows:
(I) Where plaintiffs sue in England in breach of an agreement to refer
disputes to a foreign Court, and the defendants apply for a stay,
the English Court, assuming the claim to be otherwise within the
jurisdiction, is not bound to grant a stay but has a discretion
whether to do so or not.
(2) The discretion should be exercised by granting a stay unless
strong cause for not doing so is shown.
(3) The burden of proving such strong cause is on the plaintiffs.
(4) Jn exercising its discretion the Court should take into account all
the circumstances of the particular case.
(5) In particular, but without prejudice to (4), the following matters,
where they arise, may be properly regarded:
(a) In what country the evidence on the issues of fact is situated,
or more readily available, and the effect of that on the relative
convenience and expense of trial as between the English and
foreign Courts.
(b) Whether the law of the foreign Court applies and, if so,
whether it differs from English law in any material respects.
(c) With what country either party is connected, and how closely.
(d) Whether the defendants genuinely desire trial in the foreign
country, or are only seeking procedural advantages.
(e) Whether the plaintiffs would be prejudiced by having to sue
in the foreign Court because they would
(i) be deprived of security for that claim;
(ii) be unable to enforce any judgment obtained;
(iii) be faced with a time-bar not applicable in England; or
(iv) for political, racial, religious or other reasons be unlikely
to get a fair trial. 13

With this clear enunciation of the factors for the court to consider in a
stay application, Justice Brandon set the parameters for judicial discretion with regard to choice of forum clauses in bills of lading and other
contracts for the carriage of goods by sea.

13

Elejiheria, supra note I at 242.

250 - DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES

II.

THE ELEFTHERIA - FAIR WINDS AND FOLLOWING SEAS

1. Fair Winds

The effect of the decision in Eleftheria was immediate as common law
jurisdictions eagerly gave the decision a fair reception. The decision
ushered in an articulate and regimented approach to follow when faced
with stay applications involving choice of forum clauses that expressly
prorogated a foreign jurisdiction. By this time it had become established
practice in the international shipment of goods to provide for a choice of
forum clause in the bill of lading, so this decision had immediate
resonance for the industry.
The decision also had a profound effect on the common law of the
United States, where courts were still reticent to give effect to derogation clauses or choice of law clauses. Eleftheria had a serious impact on
the American approach to private international law. This impact was
apparent in its consideration by the United States Supreme Comi in MIS
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. 14 This was the first case in the United
States to recognize the ability of parties to agree to a choice of forum
clause in their contract, even where this clause would have the effect of
limiting the jurisdiction of American courts. The court seemed to allow
for the prima facie granting of the stay unless it could be shown that to
do so was "unreasonable under the circumstances". 15 The American
Restatement on Conflicts of Law has codified this approach as being
one of prima facie acceptance of the clause, unless it is "unfair or
unreasonable" 16 to do so. Prior to the Bremen decision, derogation
clauses were considered to be a violation of public policy in the United
States and courts treated such clauses as invalid.
Canadian courts also embraced the approach advanced by Justice
Brandon in Eleftheria. The Federal Court of Appeal, in Ship MIV "Sea
Pearl" et al. v. Seven Seas Dry Cargo Shipping Corporation 17 adopted
the British approach to stay applications arising out of a choice of forum
clause. In this case, a charter was arranged in Germany for a voyage
[1972] 92 S.Ct. 1907 [Bremen].
Taken from, D.L. Shapiro, ed. Conflicts of Laws: Cases and Materials, l 0' 11 ed. (Westbury:
The Foundation Press Inc., 1996) at 170.
"' Ibid. at 168.
17
( 1982) 139 D.L.R. (3d) 669 [The Sea Pearl].
14

15
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from Chile to Canada. The charter contract was made between the
vessel owners, a Cypriot company, and the Cargo shippers, a Chilean
company. The contract contained a clause providing for arbitration of
disputes in London, England. The owners of the Sea Pearl came to the
federal court with an application for a stay in the Canadian proceedings
in favour of the choice of forum clause. As it stood then, Section
5 0( I )(b) of the Federal Court Act 18 provided the court with the discretion to stay proceedings "in the interest of justice". 19 The court affirmed
the appeal and allowed the stay to be granted. In his decision, Justice
Pratte cited positively the effect of the Eleftheria decision on the common law, particularly in the United Kingdom and the United States. He
rejected the lower courts approach to the issue and summarized the
Canadian approach to granting a stay in circumstances involving an
express choice of forum clause.
In other words, the judge decided on a mere balance of convenience.
In so doing, the learned judge applied what I consider to be a wrong
principle. Prima facie, an application to stay proceedings commenced
in the Federal Court in defiance of an undertaking to submit a dispute
to arbitration or to a foreign court must succeed because, as a rule,
contractual undertakings must be honoured. In order to depart from
that prima facie rule, "strong reasons" are needed, that is to say,
reasons that are sufficient to support the conclusion that it would not
be reasonable or just, in the circumstances, to keep the plaintiff to his
promise and enforce the contract he made with the defendant. 20

It is evident from the language used that Pratte J. applied the
Eleftheria approach regarding prima facie enforcement of choice of
forum clauses, and that he also incorporated elements of the Bremen
decision and subsequent British case law in articulating the approach for
co mis to follow in their consideration of the use of discretionary powers
to deny the stay and retain jurisdiction. Justice Pratte advanced a Canadian approach requiring "strong reasons" to be found by the court to
supp01i the denial of the stay. The effect of the "strong reasons" standard was essentially the creation of a burden on the opposing party, to
apply the considerations from the Eleftheria in a manner considerably
more detailed than a simple conveniens examination.
18
19

20

R.S.C. 1970, c. I 0 (2nd Supp.).
The Sea Pearl, supra note 17 at 681.
The Sea Pearl, supra note 17 at 681 [emphasis added].
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2. Following Seas
Eleftheria has received considerable judicial treatment by all levels of
the Federal Court in Canada in the years since The Sea Pearl. Courts
followed the Brandon J. approach very rigidly in their assessment of
stay applications, and used their judicial discretion quite sparingly in
retaining jurisdiction in matters where the parties had agreed to derogation by express choice of forum.
In the limited instances where the court did deny applications for a
stay of proceedings, the grounds for the exercise of such discretion was
usually due to some form of uncertainty in the bill of lading jurisdiction
clause, or when a careful examination of the circumstances satisfied the
"strong reasons" standard to deny a stay. In Jian Sheng Co. v. Great
Tempo S.A. (C.A.), 21 the Federal Court of Appeal denied the application
for a stay of proceedings because the applicants "failed to establish that
their principal place of business was Hong Kong," 22 in accordance with
the choice of forum clause. In Jian Sheng, the court cited with approval
the elements of the Eleftheria standard, but felt that the "primary place
of business" was not clear in the circumstances of the case. The choice
of forum clause was not express, but used the "primary place of business" description in reference to jurisdiction. After considering the
unique circumstances of the case, the court found that some uncertainty
remained and that they could not ascertain that the parties had agreed to
Hong Kong as the proper forum to satisfy the reference in the bill of
lading. In the words of Decary J.A., at para. 40:
To allow the carrier to get away with so little evidence, not even its
own, would make a mockery of the jurisdiction clause ... The respondent Great Tempo S.A. having failed to establish that its principal
place of business was in Hong Kong, the jurisdiction clause could
simply not be found to be applicable. 23

The court refused the stay in these unique circumstances, as they found
that the carrier had not met the simple burden of satisfying the very
jurisdiction clause that they incorporated into the bill of lading and were
now relying upon.
21
22

23

[ 1998] 3 F.C. 418 [Jian Sheng].
/hid. at para 6.
/bid. at para. 40, 42.
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While courts did utilize their discretion in denying stay applications
on occasion, a vast majority of the decisions recognized the reticence of
courts to deny an application if there was no ambiguity in the choice of
forum clause. This reticence was partly due to the fact that most contracts for carriage and bills of lading contained express provisions
relating to jurisdiction, so as not to provide the uncertainty that existed
in the Jian Sheng decision. Several cases went so far as to warn against
a softening of the standards adopted in Eleftheria in favour of an easier
conveniens argument. 24
One such example is the decision of Anrclj Fish Products Industries
Ltd. v. Hyundai Merchant Marine Co., 25 where the Federal Court of
Appeal reasserted the importance of respecting the contractual freedom
of the parties regarding choice of forum and again clearly recited the
importance of following the approach adopted in Eleftheria. In this case,
an Ontario company brought an action in federal court regarding the
spoilage of a shipment of fish that they had purchased from Anraj, a
Bangladeshi company. Anraj had contracted with Hyundai to ship the
cargo to New York. Hyundai was successful at obtaining a stay from a
prothonotary due to the existence of a Korean jurisdiction clause in the
bill of lading. An appeal to the motions court overturned the stay on the
grounds that the prothonotary had not properly applied Elefiheria to the
circumstances of the case, and did not properly consider a jurisdiction
that would be less expensive and from where evidence would be more
readily available.
In clearly rejecting this seemingly forum non conveniens approach,
Justice Sexton reversed the decision of the motions judge and ordered a
stay of proceedings. More importantly, Sexton J. mildly rebuked the
decision of the motions court by declaring that the court, in fact, erred in
its interpretation and application of Eleftheria. At para. 6:
I am of the view that while the Motions Judge accurately described the
factors outlined by Brandon J. in the Eleftheria case, she neglected his
pivotal premise ... 26

24 Most recently in Cereo Industries Ltd. v. The "OOCL Canada" (1999), Vancouver Registry
No. 99010 I (B.C.S.c.).
25 [2000] F.C.J. No. 944 [Anrqj Fish Products].
26
Ibid. at para. 6.
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The court then referred to the passage from Eleftheria, where Justice
Brandon warned the court to not simply pay "lip service" to the contractual freedom of the parties by recognizing the choice of forum clause
and then simply rejecting it on a simple balance of convenience. 27 With
this decision, Justice Sexton seemed to shore up Canadian adherence to
the Eleftheria precedent by reasserting its prima facie principle and
rejecting a slide into a mere conveniens approach.

III.

THE ELEFTHERIA RUNS AGROUND

While the Eleftheria approach to consideration of choice of forum
clauses in stay applications seemed to be "ship shape" as recently as the
June, 2000 Federal Court of Appeal decision in Anraj Fish Products, it
is important to note that the motions judgment at issue in that appeal was
given in December, 1999. Around the same time, a British Columbia
prothonotary decision in September, 1999 seemed to thrust the mighty
Eleftheria aground on a rocky shoal.

1. Prothonotary

In Z.J. Pompey Industrie v. Ecu-Line N. V, 28 the court was faced with a
port-to-port bill of lading emanating from the carriage of a photo processor and its four sub-assemblies from Anvers, Belgium to Seattle, Washington. A clause in the bill of lading provided that:
The contract evidenced by or contained in this Bill of Lading is
governed by the law of Belgium, and any claim of dispute arising
hereunder or in connection herewith shall be determined by the courts
in Antwerp and no other Courts. 29

This choice of forum clause was express and without any possible
ambiguity, as it clearly prorogated in favour of a comi in Antwerp, and
27

Elejiheria. supra note 1 at 242.

28

Z.J. Pompey, supra note 2.

Taken from the trial division decision of Z.J. Pompey. [1999] F.C.J. No. 2017 at para. 4 [Z.J.
Pompey - Trial Division].

29
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expressly derogated all "other courts". Far from being contentious or
ambiguous, this bill of lading advanced clear expressions of choice of
forum and choice oflaw, but the unique circumstances of this case have
caused the current uncertainty in the law.
The photo processor was a delicate cargo and it arrived at its
destination damaged to the amount of $60,000. Being a sensitive piece
of equipment, carriage by sea was the most effective mode of transport
to avoid damage to the cargo, and the owners specified that it must be
shipped "by ocean". When the prothonotary was considering the stay
application of the defendant carrier, the plaintiffs provided information
that there had been a deviation from the bill of lading and that a portion
of the carriage had been executed by rail from Montreal, Quebec to
Seattle, Washington. The plaintiffs believed that the damage had occmTed during the rail portion of the trip and claimed that the contract for
carriage actually came to an end in Montreal, when there was a deviation from the bill of lading. The defendants challenged this claim, the
facts regarding damage, and also provided evidence that the bill of
lading actually allowed for a deviation. Clause 12 of the bill was
sufficiently broad enough to permit such a deviation. 30
Justice Hargrave began his consideration of the stay application
with an immediate recognition of the express jurisdiction clause con' tained in the bill of lading and proceeded to an analysis based on an
Eleftheria approach. The court carefully considered the "strong reasons" portion of the Elefiheria analysis and concluded at para. 5 that:
Taken as a whole these factors are substantial, but in this instance are
just short of the strong case which, by The Eleftheria, the Plaintiffs
must present in order to override the jurisdiction clause. 31

It is at this point that Justice Hargrave decided to part from the common

law and with his next sentence carved a sharp judicial turn, which ripped
a large hole in the hull of the Eleftheria. He continued:
However the matter does not end here, for the Plaintiffs present a
persuasive case that the contract between the Plaintiffs and ECU-Line
N.V. came to an end in Montreal and thus there is no jurisdiction
clause to apply. 32

30
31

32

The clause is reprinted in the trial division decision. !bid. at para. 14.
Z.l. Pompey, supra note 2 at para. 5 [emphasis added].
Z.J. Pompey, supra note 2 at para. 5.
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What is most perplexing is that from this point forward in his decision,
Justice Hargrave proceeded to decide the merits of the case by an
examination of awkward notions of fundamental breach and a complete
consideration of the merits of reliance on the deviation clause. Justice
Hargrave looked beyond the application for a stay of proceedings and
appeared to make findings of fact and law regarding the dispute arising
out of the contract. Justice Hargrave justifies this departure from stare
decisis in a simple statement at paragraph 8:
ECU-Line submits I ought not to deal with fundamental breach or
deviation, for those are factual issues to be determined on the merits by
the trial judge. The answer to this is not complex. An interim injunction, obtained on an interlocutory application, which requires a testing
of the waters by looking at the strength of the case, the harm being
caused and the balance of convenience, is analogous to a denial of a
stay on the basis of a strong case that the jurisdiction clause is just not
applicable. 33

This departure from Eleftheria and the rationale advanced by Justice
Hargrave with respect to the stay proceeding being "analogous" to an
interlocutory injunction is the crux of the uncertainty that currently
exists in the law, and forms the primary issue facing the Supreme Court
of Canada.

2. Trial Division
The Z.J Pompey3 4 advanced to the trial division of the federal court on
appeal by the defendants, ECU-Line. Of the numerous grounds of
appeal, almost all of them stemmed from the departure from Eleftheria
and the fact that the lower court appeared to decide the merits of the case
in their determination of the stay application. ECU-Line brought nine
separate grounds of reversible error on the part of the prothonotary. In
addition to these grounds, ECU-Line submitted that their deviation was
also pennissible under both the Hague Rules35 and Hague-Vis by Rules ,36
33
34

Z.J. Pompey, supra note 2 at para. 8.
Z.J. Pompey Trial Division, supra note 29.

35 International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Laiv relating to Bills of
Lading, 25 August 1924, 120 L.N.T.S. 155, 51 Stat. 233 (entered into force 2 June 1931)
[Hague Rules].
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which could apply to the transaction. ECU-Line also claimed that the
doctrine of separability required that the jurisdiction clause be enforced
regardless of whether other provisions of the contract failed. As was the
case at the prothonotary, ECU-Line continued to challenge the owner's
account of the "special request" regarding transport of the cargo.
In dismissing the appeal, Justice Blais began as so many courts have,
with the famous dictum of Brandon J. from page 242 of Eleftheria. From
this established approach, the motions court then examined the reasoning provided by the prothonotary for his conclusion that the contract, as
evidenced by the bill of lading, had come to an end. Justice Blais
justified this determination using elements of Eleftheria procedure,
while omitting the fact that the prothonotary actually concluded that the
circumstances of the case were "just short of the strong case" 37 required
by Eleftheria standard.
The decision to stay a proceeding is a question of facts of each case
and the Prothonotary had the discretion to render the decision he had,
based on the facts before the Court after addressing the criteria established by The Eleftheria case. 38

With this judgment the trial division of the Federal Court found that the
prothonotary had not erred in their exercise of discretion, but Justice
Blais' reasoning leaves the impression that the prothonotary had exercised this discretion in full accordance with the approach outlined in
Eleftheria. This fact is difficult to reconcile with the lower ruling, which
indicated that the circumstances of the case were "just short" of the
Eleftheria standard regarding judicial discretion in a stay application.

3. Federal Court of Appeal
The consideration of Z.I Pompey by the Federal Court of Appeal3 9 in
December, 2000 confirmed the current state of uncertainty in the comProtocol to Amend the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law
Relating to Bills of Lading, 23 February 1968, 1412 U.N.T.S. 121 (entered into force 23 June
1977) [Visby Rules].
37
Taken from the prothonotary decision. Z.l. Pompey. supra note 2 at para. 5.
38
Z./. Pompey - Trial Division, supra note 29 at para. 32.
39
[2001] F.C.J. No. 96. [Z.I. Pompey - Federal Court] The judgment of the court was not
released until January, 2001.
36
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mon law and the scuttling of the good ship Eleftheria. The bridge
captain for the scuttling order was Justice Issac, and he was ably assisted
by first mates Justices Linden and Sharlow. 40
After a review of the judicial history of the matter and a review of
the facts giving rise to the dispute, the court recognized the three main
issues of contention brought by the appellants for their detennination.
The first dealt with fundamental breach and unreasonable deviation.
The appellant claimed that even if one of these notions occurred it would
not render the jurisdiction clause unenforceable. The second issue concerned whether the court had jurisdiction to consider the merits of the
case in light of the jurisdiction clause. The final issue was the claim that
the prothonotary had "erred in inquiring into the merits of the dispute in
the context of a stay application". 41
Leaving aside the tests and standards required for judicial review,
which also formed an impotiant part of this appeal, the central issue in
the eyes of the court turned on a determination of whether the
prothonotary's use of discretion had given "sufficient weight to all
relevant considerations". 42 This sufficient weight inquiry formed an
important paii of the consideration of the findings of the motions court
regarding the prothonotary decision. In this inquiry into issues of discretion of the motions court, the Federal Court of Appeal made three
important findings, which face the Supreme Court of Canada currently.
First, the court found that the motions judge properly reviewed the
reasons of the prothonotary and concluded that
"did not
govern the case". 43 This is a troublesome finding, as the prothonotary
analydetermined that the circumstances of the case failed an
sis by falling "short" of the requirements. That court actually ruled that
the contract for carriage had come to an end in Montreal. The motions
court then seemed to approve of the prothonotary decision, but on the
basis that the lower court had properly exercised its discretion within the
approach to a stay application. By declarcontext of a broad
At this point of my treatise, I will attempt to curtail the continuation of my maritime
metaphor somewhat, at risk of making the reader seasick.
41
Z./. Pompey - Federal Court, supra note 39 at para. 18. The other grounds were contained in
paragraphs 16 and 17.
42
Taken from a passage from the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Reza v. Canada [1994]
2 S.C.R. 394, which was cited with approval by the court at Z.I. Pompey - Federal Court, supra
note 39 at para. 24.
43
Z.I. Pompey - Federal Court, supra note 39 at para. 26.

40
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ing that the Eleftheria "did not govern", the Federal Court of Appeal
does not appear to resolve the ambiguity between the two lower court
rulings in this regard.
Second, Justice Issac made reference to Jian Sheng in te1ms of an
example of an earlier departure from the Eleftheria precedent. With this
reference, it appears that the court may have obfuscated the findings of
the court in Jian Sheng. He claims that Jian Sheng deviated from
Eleftheria by allowing refusal of a stay "where the appellant had not led
sufficient evidence to support the existence of jurisdiction elsewhere
than Canada". 44 The refusal in Jian Sheng flowed from the uncertainty
contained in the jurisdiction clause itself, as it was not an express
prorogation, but simply a "primary place of business" clause. This
clause was found to be too vague to be enforceable in the circumstances,
particularly due to the fact that the carrier seeking to rely on the clause
had not presented sufficient evidence to resolve any of the uncertainties
regarding its "primary place of business". While a stay was indeed
denied in Jian Sheng, the decision did not seem to do so in a manner that
was offensive to the Ele:ftheria precedent.
Third, the court used the approach toward interlocutory injunctions
advanced by the House of Lords in American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon
Ltd. 45 and applied it to the application for a stay of proceedings. This
jurisprudential leap was justified by reference to a Supreme Court of
Canada decision that declared that interlocutory injunctions and stay of
proceedings were "remedies of the same nature". 46
The Federal Court of Appeal concluded by dismissing the appeal
and declaring that the tripartite test used for interlocutory injunctions
was "the proper test to apply in stay applications". 47 This new test
requires the court to make a preliminary assessment of the merits in
order to consider a balance between the harm of granting the stay
against the harm of denying the stay. In advancing this new test, the
Federal Court of Appeal recognized that the lower court "did not refer to
these authorities" ,48 but felt that the spirit of this approach was outlined
by the motions court.
44

Z.I. Pompey - Federal Court, supra note 39 at para. 27.
[1975] I AIIE.R.504.
46
Z.I. Pompey - Federal Court, supra note 39 at para 29. Taken from Manitoba (Attorney
Genera!) v. Metropolitan Stores (MTS) Ltd [I 987] I S.C.R. I I 0.
47
Z.I. Pompey - Federal Court, supra note 39 at para. 3 I.
48
Z.I. Pompey - Federal Court, supra note 39.
45
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The validity of this new test is a matter that will be determined by the
Supreme Court of Canada, when it clarifies the law in regard to the
:i.pplication for a stay of proceedings.

IV.

STATUTORY CURRENTS

As was indicated at the outset, there have also been statutory developments that affect bills of lading, contracts for carriage, and related
:iocuments concerning the international trade of goods. Historically, the
Canadian parliament has created legislation to recognize international
:ievelopments in the carriage of goods by sea from the 1924 Hague
Rules49 to the 1968 Hague-Visby Rules, 50 and finally the latest evolution
found in the 1978 Hamburg Rules. 51 The most recent example of this
evolution was the recognition of the Hamburg Rules by Canadian law
with the passage of the Marine Liability Act52 in 2001. While this
recognition fell short of fully adopting the rules, the legislation contained a review provision to allow for regular consideration of adoption
of the convention. The act re-asserts the application of the Hague-Vis by
Rules in Canada. Section 43 applies these rules to Canadian law and to
the carriage of goods by water within Canada when a bill of lading is
used. Section 45, however, applies the Hamburg Rules in some limited
circumstances prior to their full adoption by parliament. Section 45 of
the Marine Liability Act states:
45( I) The Hamburg Rules have the force of law in Canada in respect
of contracts for the carriage of goods by water between different states
as described in Article 2 of those Rules. [emphasis added]

Article 2 of the Hamburg Rules is entitled "Scope of Application" and
applies the provisions of the convention in circumstances where the
"port of loading ... port of discharge ... or optional port of discharge" are
located in a contracting state, or if the bill of lading or other contractual
Hague Rules, supra note 35.
Visby Rules, supra note 36.
51
United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, 31 March 1978, U.N. Doc. Al
CONF.89/13, 17 l.L.M. 608 (entered into force I November 1992) [Hamburg Rules].
52 s.c. 2001, c. 6.

19

50

THE SINKING OF THE ELEFTHERIA ... 261

document "is issued in a contracting state" or expressly provides that the
rules "govern the contract". 53 Canada is not a contracting state to the
convention, but the Marine Liability Act gives effect to the Hamburg
Rules in Canada for bills of lading, which relate to contracting states in a
manner provided for in Article 2.
Of considerable importance to the context of jurisdiction clauses in
bills of lading and their application in Canada is section 46 of the
Marine Liability Act, which appears to limit the ability of courts to
exercise their discretion to retain jurisdiction in the presence of a derogation of Canadian courts. The section applies to contracts for carriage
of goods by water not bound by the Hamburg Rules:
46( 1) If a contract for the carriage of goods by water to which the
Hamburg Rules do not apply provides for the adjudication or arbitration of claims arising under the contract in a place other than Canada
a claimant may institute judicial or arbitral proceedings in a court or
arbitral tribunal in Canada that would be competent to determine the
claim ifthe the contracts had referred the claim to Canada, where
(a

the actual port of loading or discharge, or the intended port of
loading or discharge under the contract, is in Canada;

(b) the person against whom the claim is made resides or has a place
of business, branch or agency in Canada; or
(c) the contract was made in Canada.
[emphasis added]

The effect of section 46( 1) appears to provide express statutory authority for courts to retain jurisdiction in a stay application if one of the three
grounds are satisfied. These tangible "connections" to Canada outlined
in the three-part list appear to justify the intrusion of a Canadian court
into the agreement of the parties, and permits the court to ignore the
choice of forum clause that derogated Canadian courts.
Essentially, this section of the Marine Liability Act appears to
overrule a traditional Eleftheria approach to stay applications, when the
plaintiff can demonstrate that the contract was made in Canada, that the
party applying for a stay has a place of business or branch office in
Canada, or if the po1i of loading or discharge was a Canadian port. It
would appear that by expressly providing for jurisdiction to be retained
according to the s. 46 three-part connection examination, that the legis53

Hamburg Rules, supra note 51 at Art. 2( I).
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ature intended for the common law to continue to apply to circum;tances falling outside the scope of the section. In these cases, the
liscretion remains in the hands of the court to stay proceedings or retain
urisdiction according to the traditional Ele.ftheria standards. It will be
nteresting to see if the Supreme Court of Canada considers this recent
nanifestation of legislative intent in regard to jurisdiction and bills of
ading. It is difficult to fully address how the Marine Liability Act
)rovisions would affect the circumstances found in Z.J. Pompey. It is
llso not certain that this legislation would even apply, as it came into
after the stay was denied.
However, a primafacie examination would conclude that s. 46( 1) of
he Marine Liability Act may not apply to the facts of the case. Belgium
s governed by the Hague-Visby Rules and the United States is governed
JY the Hague Rules, so while it does seem like the Hamburg Rules
.vould not apply to the transaction, it would be difficult to satisfy one of
:he "connections" with Canada required by s. 46(1 ). It does not appear
:hat the carrier has a Canadian office, but this might apply if more
information was available. It appears that the plaintiff's only avenue
.vould be a continuation of their argument that Montreal was the port of
'discharge" in the circumstances, which is again troublesome, as it
possibly delves into an examination of the merits of the case. Reference
to "loading" and "discharge" appear to refer to the start and finish of the
Unless the court is prepared to take a broad approach to the
of "discharge", it appears that the contract began in Belgium
and was completed in the United States. This would make the matter fall
outside the scope of s. 46(1 ).

v. WILL THE SUPREME COURT SAVE A SINKING SHIP?
1. While the Eleftheria Flounders

The wheels of justice have continued to grind in the period between the
initial treatment of Z.1. Pompey in 1999 and the time it has taken to reach
the Supreme Court of Canada. With bills of lading being the backbone
of contracts for carriage in the world of international trade, it is not
surprising that disputes have continued to surface regarding the use of
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choice of forum clauses. From an examination of these cases that have
been decided during the Z.I. Pompey appeal process and have considered the effect of the Marine Liability Act, it appears that Eleftheria is
still assisting courts in their consideration of stay applications.
In Incremona-Salerno Manni Affini Siciliani (I.S.MA.S.) s.n.c. v.
Castor (The) (T.D.)5 4 , the Federal Court dealt with an application by the
carrier for a stay of proceedings in favour of the choice of forum clause
in the bill of lading, which specified for the matter to be decided in
Germany. At issue in this case was whether s. 46(1) of the Marine
Liability Act applied to the facts, even though it came into force after the
carrier had applied for a stay. The court ruled that the section did apply
to the facts of the case, as the intended port of discharge was in Canada.
The court ruled that this effectively removed the court's discretion
under s. 50(1) of the Federal Court Act.
Clearly, subsection 46(1) does Iimit the discretion of this Court to stay
proceedings in the interest of justice where there is a jurisdiction
clause, such as on the facts before me, in a bill oflading. 55

This judgment by the Federal Court in December, 2001 makes it clear
that s. 46( 1) of the Marine Liability Act directly limits the discretion of
the court in a stay of proceedings application under s. 50( 1) of the
Federal Court Act. If the bill of lading, or the circumstances surrounding the carriage of goods itself have a connection with Canada in
accordance with the three principles of the section, the court is provided
statutory authority to retain jurisdiction.
As recently as September, 2002 the Federal Court considered the
application of an exclusive jurisdiction clause, which expressly provided for arbitration of disputes in New York, in Nestle Canada Inc. c.
Viljandi (Le). 56 The plaintiff claimed to not have sufficient knowledge of
a second bill of lading involved in the carriage of evaporated milk from
Sherbrooke, Quebec to San Juan, Puerto Rico. The goods were damaged
upon arrival and the defendant carrier sought to stay the action in
Canada in favour of the jurisdiction clause. This case serves as an
important indication of the current position of courts in Canada, and that
the judicial approach to a stay of proceedings application may be in
54

55
56

[2002] 3 F.C. 447 [The Castor].
Ibid. at para. 9.
[2002] A.C.F. no. 1315.
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transition.
On doit noter en aparte que bien que le procureur de Nestle ait souleve
dans ses representations ecrites que la decision de la Cour d'appel
federale dans
Pompey (Z.I.) Industrie et al. v. Ecu-Line N.V. et
al., [2001] F.C.J. No. 96, ait pu enoncer un test qui ecarterait le test
traditionnel de
Eleftheria, ce dernier n'a pas en plaidoirie orale
insiste sur cette decision de la Cour d'appel federale et a entrepris de
revoir la situation en fonction du test de l'arret Eleftheria. C'est done
en fonction de ce dernier test, tel que repris par cette Cour a de
nombreuses reprises, que l 'on poursuivra notre etude. 57

Loosely translated, Prothonotary Morneau noted "en aparte " (as an
aside) that Nestle could have raised the Federal Court of Appeal decision from Z.I. Pompey, which may have permitted a departure from the
Eleftheria test. They chose to argue under the traditional Elefiheria
approach, so that is how the court reviewed the application. The Z.J.
Pompey was raised in passing by the prothonotary, but he did not
indicate a preference for the new approach, or the Eleftheria precedent.
The court also recognized that in this instance, the matter of tests were
essentially a moot point due to the fact that the stay application was
directly affected by the Marine Liability Act. In his concluding paragraph:
Partant, si je n' avais pas eu a considerer l 'application de l 'article 46 de
la Loi, j'aurias conclu sous la troisieme question que Nestle n'a pas
demontre des motifeforts pour amener la Cour a conclure qu'il serait
deraisonnable ou injuste to tenir Nestle au respect de la Clause. 58

The court recognized the application of statutory developments on the
application of choice of law clauses, and in this case denied the stay
according to the Marine Liability Act. The court did make reference to _
the possibility of an abandonment of the Eleftheria, but chose to make
findings according to the "strong reasons" ("motifs forts") approach
governing use of discretion.

57
58

Ibid. at para. 28.
Ibid. at para. 41 [emphasis added].
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VI.

CONCLUSIONS

The Supreme Court of Canada stands in judgment over several crucial
issues in the final appeal in Z.J. Pompey. Most have a potentially serious
impact on the sanctity of contract and the ability for pmiies to prorogate
and derogate jurisdiction by agreement. The dispute arises out of the
possible application of a deviation clause, or whether there was actually
consensus ad idem in the contract for carriage. These issues require
determinations on their merit, which should not form part of the considerations of a stay application.
The Supreme Court does not need to look any fu1iher than the
circumstances of Elefiheria itself. Too often comis have become exceedingly familiar with the popular Brandon J. quotation from page 242
of the Lloyd's Law Report, but are less so with the original facts facing
Justice Brandon. History often repeats itself. Like Elefiheria, the prothonotary in Z.J. Pompey was faced with a dispute arising out of a bill of
lading, which contained an express choice of jurisdiction. Like
Eleftheria, there was disagreement between the party applying for the
stay and the party attempting to avoid application of the choice of forum
clause. Like Eleftheria, there was a deviation from the voyage as described by the bill of lading, but in circumstances where the carrier
believed this deviation to be justified by their contract. Unlike
Eleftheria, however, the Canadian prothonotary embarked on an examination of fundamental breach and consideration of the deviation clause
in a manner that evinced a consideration of the merits of the dispute and
contract itself. This is the very examination that the express choice of
forum clause prohibits by agreement of the parties to derogate all other
jurisdictions.
The court may consider the legislative intent of the Marine Liability
Act, as it limits the discretion of the court to a narrow range of connecting factors in their ability to retain jurisdiction. It makes no reference to
a balancing of harm, or consideration of the strengths of the case in the
manner that a comt would adopt towards an interlocutory injunction or a
pre-trial remedy like a Mareva injunction. Parliament clearly articulated
a limited number of factual connections to Canada that would warrant
the courts intrusion into the bill of lading.
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The court should overturn the decision of the Federal Court of
Appeal and rescue the Eleftheria from its watery grave. The approach
advocated by Justice Brandon in Eleftheria has served the common law
well over the last few decades by allowing the court to retain some
discretion regarding jurisdiction clauses, but first and foremost, by
respecting the agreement reached between the parties. As was stated in
Eleftheria and repeated approvingly as recently as Anraj Fish Products,
courts must endeavour "not just to pay lip service" 59 to the agreement of
the parties, but respect their agreement regarding possible disputes and
the method of settlement. The new tripartite test enunciated by the
Federal Court of Appeal would not respect the freedom for parties to
contract into or out of a jurisdiction, which has become an established
practice in the international sale and carriage of goods.
It would require courts to assess the merits of the case, even though
the parties involved had agreed to only have the merits assessed in an
express jurisdiction. Connectivity to the Canadian jurisdiction outside
of express statutory provisions should have no effect on the application
of an express term of the bill of lading or contract for carriage. Nor
should considerations of issues of conveniens or a balancing of harms
allow a party not to be held to its agreement. As that old legal adage
warns, "[c]hancery mends no mans bargain". 60 The Supreme Court of
Canada should begin the bailing out of the good ship Eleftheria and
restore some certainty to the flow of goods as expressed by bills of
lading and other contracts for carriage. If they do not, international
carriers may desire to have less and less connection with Canada, m
exchange for some certainty in their operations.

59

Elefiheria, supra note l at 245; Anraj Fish Products, supra note 25.
Lord Nottingham in Maynard v. Moseley ( 1676), 3 Swans. 651 at 655, 36 E.R. l 009, as
quoted in S.M. Waddams, The Law of Contracts, 4th ed. (Aurora: Canada Law Book, 1999) al
319.
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